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Deconstructing Mythic Triumph: 
The Battle of New Orleans
Catherine James 
During the War of 1812, the Battle of New Orleans was a conclusive 
American victory in what was an otherwise militarily inconclusive war. In 
the nineteenth century, Americans celebrated January 8, 1815 as a patriotic 
holiday equivalent to the Fourth of July. Most American historians of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth century asserted that the battle was 
extremely important because had the British captured New Orleans, 
they would have probably repudiated the Treaty of Ghent and tried to 
hem in the United States east of the Mississippi River. These historians 
also focused on American military tactics, particularly the long odds that 
the outnumbered Americans overcame to beat the British. All American 
historians chronicling the Battle of New Orleans in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century placed Andrew Jackson at the center of their 
works. They believed the battle was important because America had been 
humiliated by the British in the war up until that point, then Jackson 
took charge and annihilated the British to become the “Hero of America” 
and the “Symbol of the Age,” going on to capture the presidency on the 
basis of that popularity. With the advent of social and cultural history in 
the mid-twentieth century, American historians’ views of the Battle of 
New Orleans changed significantly, from a defining moment to a minor 
incident that America won due to a lack of British coordination.1 The role 
of African-Americans, Indian tribes such as the Choctaws, Creoles, and 
pirates under Jean Lafitte have all been explored by historians in recent 
1  Robert V. Remini, The Battle of New Orleans (New York: Viking, 1999), 217-220. 
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years. Moreover, the heroism of Andrew Jackson in the battle has been 
questioned, with several historians branding him a military despot instead 
of national savior. Finally, the historiography of the Battle of New Orleans 
is even broadening to include women and music.
Within the domain of Battle of New Orleans historiography, the 
most basic category is that of military strategy. Struggle for the Gulf Border-
lands by Frank Owsley, Jr. ranks as the standard work on American tactics, 
drawing on Jackson’s papers, Department of War records, and Creole Major 
André Latour’s memoir. Owsley cites figures of 5,000 American troops ver-
sus 10,000 British soldiers and stresses Jackson’s strong defensive line with-
in a swamp and wooded area.2 Yet, Owsley argues that Jackson’s best tactic 
was his “ability to drive himself and his army through almost any kind 
of hardship, to maintain good discipline…, and never to lose confidence 
that he would win in the end.”3 While agreeing with Owsley’s flattering 
assessment of Jackson’s leadership, historian Charles Brooks’ The Siege of 
New Orleans emphasizes the tactical value of a mud breastwork Jackson’s 
troops and conscripted slaves constructed along his defensive line, which 
forced the British to attack head-on across unprotected, flat terrain and thus 
doomed them to suffer massive casualties against an inexperienced Amer-
ican army.4 In 1969, Wilburt Brown offered a new view of the battle’s strat-
egy, evaluating British Admiralty Office records and concluding that the 
American navy under direction of Commandant Patterson played a crucial 
role in supporting Jackson and demoralized British troops by steady bom-
bardment.5 Finally, a provocatively revisionist thesis proposed by military 
2  Frank Owsley, Jr., Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands: The Creek War and the Battle of New 
Orleans 1812-1815 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1981), 157-162. 
3  Ibid., 5. 
4  Charles B. Brooks, The Siege of New Orleans (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961), 
227-252. 
5  Wilburt S. Brown, The Amphibious Campaign for West Florida and Louisiana, 1814-1815: A 
Critical Review of Strategy and Tactics at New Orleans (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 
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historian John Mahon harshly criticizes Jackson for his negligence in de-
fending his right flank, a mistake that Mahon claims could have altered the 
eventual outcome of the battle and, at the least, posed a serious threat.6 
 After works on American battle tactics and strategy, the next major 
category of Battle of New Orleans historiography analyzes the consequenc-
es of the American victory. The traditional reading of the battle as a defin-
ing moment, indeed as justification of American national identity, remains 
the view of most American historians today. For example, Donald Hickey’s 
benchmark recent history of the War of 1812 confirms that the Battle of New 
Orleans “promoted national self-confidence and encouraged the heady ex-
pansionism that lay at the heart of American foreign policy for the rest of 
the century.”7 Likewise, Robert Remini’s monograph The Battle of New Orle-
ans describes the American victory as a pivot because in “one glorious mo-
ment the nation had demonstrated that it had the strength, will, and ability 
to defend its freedom and proved to the world that it was here to stay, that 
its sovereignty and rights were to be respected by all.”8 In recent decades, 
however, some historians have questioned the nationalistic implications of 
the battle. Because New Orleans was the overall war’s only victory and won 
by a Southerner, Frank Owsley, Jr.’s Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands argues 
that the battle disproportionately aided the South and led to the ascendance 
of that section’s political power.9 Daniel Walker Howe, author of the defini-
tive history of the early American Republic, also suggests a reinterpretation 
of the battle’s consequences. He asserts that the Battle of New Orleans de-
finitively ended fear of foreign domination, but concurrently manifested a 
1969), 169, 175-179. 
6  John K. Mahon, The War of 1812 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1972), 368.
7  Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1990), 3. 
8  Remini, Battle of New Orleans, 195.  
9  Owsley, Jr., 194-195.  
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tension within American society over national destiny – a future of urban, 
industrial progress, as evidenced by mass-produced artillery at the battle, 
or a future of westward expansion and individual frontiersmen, epitomized 
by Jackson.10
 Any history of the Battle of New Orleans necessarily involves 
Andrew Jackson, who took charge and annihilated the British to become 
an American hero. This historiographical category is traditional, but it has 
many present-day adherents, who believe that the Battle of New Orleans 
launched Jackson’s political career on the basis of his personal popularity 
as a victorious general and eventually secured him the presidency. John 
W. Ward’s aptly named 1955 work, Andrew Jackson: Symbol for an Age, 
stands as the best example of the hagiography surrounding Jackson and 
his New Orleans victory. Ward declares that “[i]n the victory at New 
Orleans, Jackson was explicitly and directly connected with God.”11 
Currently, Robert Remini, Jackson’s chief modern scholarly biographer, 
continues the “Great Man” history of Jackson and New Orleans. Remini’s 
monograph, The Battle of New Orleans, affirms that, due to “his victory 
at New Orleans, General Jackson became a hero such as the people of 
America had never enjoyed before.”12 He concludes that the American 
public elected Jackson to the presidency, despite his lack of education 
and few political credentials, as a reward for his fundamental role in 
upholding American independence at New Orleans.13
Controversy over American involvement in the Vietnam War 
convinced some historians to reassess the glory enveloping previous 
10  Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 17-18. 
11  John W. Ward, Andrew Jackson: Symbol for an Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1955), 108. 
12  Remini, Battle of New Orleans, 197. 
13  Ibid., 198.  
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American military engagements, including the Battle of New Orleans. 
From a defining moment that catapulted Andrew Jackson to the White 
House, the battle plunged to a minor incident that America won due to 
sheer luck, not superior strategy. Writing in 1969, historian Carson Ritchie 
was an early skeptic of the defining moment category of historiography. 
In fact, Ritchie acerbically describes the battle as “won and lost in a 
matter of minutes.”14 He also contends that British military blunders, 
such as lack of guns and equipment as well as general panic among 
troops, handed victory to the Americans, thus rejecting prevailing 
historiographic accounts of strong American defenses.15 Similarly, J. C. 
A. Stagg, author of Mr. Madison’s War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare 
in the Early American Republic, 1783-1830, argues that America emerged 
victorious at the Battle of New Orleans because of adequacy rather than 
tactical supremacy.16 Stagg asserts the battle was no defining moment, but 
an episode when “the United States had done little more than survive.”17 
More recently, Daniel Walker Howe has reinterpreted the American 
victory as unnecessary, “a particularly tragic result of the slowness of 
communication at the start of the nineteenth century.”18 In other words, 
the battle was avoidable since a peace treaty between the United States 
and Britain had already been signed in December 1814, hence invalidating 
the reason for the battle in January 1815; ironically, news of the Treaty of 
Ghent did not arrive in the United States until February 1815, subsequent 
to the battle.  
Historians have also reconsidered the generic white male 
14  Carson Ritchie, “The Guns of New Orleans,” The History Teacher 2, no. 4 (May 1969): 13.
15  Ibid., 10-12.  
16  J. C. A. Stagg, Mr. Madison’s War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American 
Republic, 1783-1830 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 498. 
17  Ibid., 501. 
18  Howe, 15-16. 
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characterization of the Battle of New Orleans, looking anew at primary 
sources to discover what role many diverse peoples had in the battle. 
Prompted by the Civil Rights Movement, African-American historian 
Donald E. Everett asserted in a groundbreaking 1955 journal article that 
a battalion composed of free black New Orleans residents played an 
important role in Jackson’s victory. According to Everett, the free black 
troops provided Jackson much-needed manpower and showed more skill 
and courage in battle than white soldiers. Everett views the Battle of New 
Orleans as a very early example of racial equality because Jackson granted 
free black troops the same pay and provisions as white soldiers, as well as 
promising respect for their service within his ranks.19 However, writing 
a few decades after Everett, historian Robert Remini called attention to 
another aspect of the African-American experience in his book Andrew 
Jackson and The Course of American Empire. Remini argues that free black 
troops played only a minor role in the Battle of New Orleans and instead 
states that the unpaid, forced labor of black slaves who built fortifications 
for Jackson decided the American victory. Indeed, Remini equates the 
role of slaves in the Battle of New Orleans to the South’s rise on the basis 
of slave labor and thereby infers unwillingness among Americans to 
acknowledge the wrongs that coexist with past national triumphs.20
Another facet of the historiography of the Battle of New Orleans 
involves the question of whether the Creole population, with only two 
years experience of statehood, was dedicated to the American cause and, 
by extension, Jackson’s leadership. The dominant interpretation presumes 
that while Creoles may not have openly engaged in treason, they did not 
19  Donald E. Everett, “Emigres and Militiamen: Free Persons of Color in New Orleans, 1803-
1815,” Journal of Negro History 38, no. 4 (October 1953): 395-398.
20  Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire, 1767-1821 (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1977), 273. 
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enthusiastically support Jackson’s efforts to defend their city. As Charles 
Brooks observes in The Siege of New Orleans, Jackson “carried from New 
Orleans more than the memory of a great military victory; he carried the 
experience of trying to govern a strong-willed people.”21 Even Donald 
Hickey, author of the preeminent modern account of the War of 1812, 
concludes that Creoles “radiated disloyalty and defeatism.”22 In contrast, 
Paul Gelpi, Jr. poses a challenge to the prevailing consensus about the 
non-Anglo-American population’s allegiance. He asserts that the Battle of 
New Orleans served as the climax of a “process of Americanization that 
Louisiana’s Creole community underwent.”23 Examining the Battalion 
d’Orleans, an all-volunteer militia unit composed solely of New Orleans 
Creoles, Gelpi determined that, although many contemporary Americans 
identified Creoles as a security threat, the battalion demonstrated 
Creole patriotism, defending the city itself and hence enabling Jackson 
to concentrate on the vital periphery.24 Interestingly, Joseph Tregle 
reinterprets the question of Creole loyalty into a question of Jackson’s 
own paranoia; in effect, Tregle argues the battle was a cross-cultural clash 
within American society.25 He states that “New Orleans was entirely 
outside the general’s experience…and he was convinced that from these 
exotic people, native and foreign alike, one could only expect difficulty 
and most likely treachery.”26 
Perhaps the most colorful category of Battle of New Orleans his-
toriography is that of the Baratarian pirates’ role in defeating the British. 
21  Brooks, 270. 
22  Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, 206. 
23  Paul D. Gelpi, Jr., “Mr. Jefferson’s Creoles: The Battalion d’Orléans and the 
Americanization of Creole Louisiana, 1803-1815,” Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana 
Historical Association 48, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 297. 
24  Ibid., 297-312. 
25  Joseph G. Tregle, “Andrew Jackson and the Continuing Battle of New Orleans,” Journal of 
the Early Republic 1, no. 4 (Winter 1981): 373-378. 
26  Ibid., 375.  
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In recent decades, the view of the majority of historians has been that Jean 
Laffite and his pirate crew were second only to Jackson in saving the nation 
from British subjugation. This interpretation was first advanced by Jane Lu-
cas De Grummond in her 1961 monograph, The Baratarians and the Battle of 
New Orleans. Drawing on a journal supposedly written by Lafitte, De Grum-
mond declared that the pirates provided vital arms, men, and information 
to Jackson, which afforded him a strategic edge over the British.27 In assent 
with De Grummond, military historian Wilburt Brown confirms that “it is 
possible that Jackson might have defended the city successfully without the 
aid of the Baratarians, but it is probable that he could not have done so if 
Lafitte and his men had accepted British offers.”28 A decidedly positive as-
sessment of the pirates’ contribution is found in Donald Hickey’s The War of 
1812, in which he verifies their invaluable artillery skill and familiarity with 
local topography and concludes that “Jean Lafitte the Baratarian leader, got 
along so well with Jackson that he became the general’s unofficial aide-de-
camp.”29 Recently, however, Robert Vogel has offered a revisionist concept 
of the pirates’ pivotal role. First, Vogel maintains that Jackson grudgingly 
accepted the pirates’ help, actually referring to them as “hellish banditti.” 
Upon critical review of primary documents, namely district court case files 
and military disbursement records, Vogel found that the Baratarians did 
not give large quantities of either guns or ammunition; in addition, only 
about fifty pirates – not hundreds as formerly alleged – fought with Jackson 
on January 8, 1815.30 Lastly, Vogel objects to claims of the pirates’ patriot-
ic motivation in joining Jackson. He insists that “a more rational explana-
27  Jane Lucas De Grummond, The Baratarians and the Battle of New Orleans (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1961), 18-21.
28  Brown, 31. 
29  Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, 207. 
30  Robert C. Vogel, “Jean Laffite, the Baratarians, and the Battle of New Orleans: A 
Reappraisal,” Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association 41, no. 3 
(Summer 2000): 264-271.
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tion would be that the Bartarians came to the aid of Jackson because they 
concluded it was to their advantage to do so as underworld businessmen” 
who were deterred by British and Spanish naval surveillance of the Gulf of 
Mexico.31
 Currently, the historiography of the Battle of New Orleans 
is experiencing a renewal of interest and challenging the status quo 
of military history, male history, and glorified history. In fact, one of 
the foremost trends in this historiography today has been to question 
the heroism of Andrew Jackson in the battle, with several historians 
branding him a military despot instead of national savior. Typical of 
earlier historians, Robert Remini admitted Jackson’s implementation of 
martial law prior to the battle and his continuation of it weeks after the 
battle ended was not justified. Remini states that “Jackson established a 
police state with no other authority but his own. He clearly overreached 
himself.”32 Yet, Remini also excuses Jackson’s martial law, arguing that his 
“total sense of duty” compelled him to continue martial law.33 In contrast, 
Matthew Warshaeur conclusively labels Jackson a military despot. He 
stresses that Jackson’s “cancellation of the civil government touched 
on one of the most fundamental notions of American freedom: that the 
military shall remain subordinate to civil authority. Martial law in New 
Orleans was a classic republican battle between liberty and power.”34 
Warshaeur emphasizes the absence of a precedent in America for 
suspending habeas corpus and contends that Jackson’s implementation 
of martial law in New Orleans had long-term consequences, instilling 
31  Ibid., 275. 
32  Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire, 311.  
33  Ibid., 312. 
34  Matthew Warshauer, “The Battle of New Orleans Reconsidered: Andrew Jackson and 
Martial Law,” Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association 39, no. 3 
(Summer 1998): 262. 
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in Jackson a “sense of unlimited authority. Indeed, such attributes were 
exceedingly apparent in later episodes, such as Jackson’s invasion of 
Florida in 1819 and his later war on the Bank of the United States.”35 
Like Warshaeur, Joseph Tregle condemns Jackson’s martial law in New 
Orleans, but claims that the greatest impact of Jackson’s unjustified actions 
was seen in the presidential election of 1828. In the campaign, Tregle says, 
Jackson’s opponents’ most powerful weapon was the image of him as 
disrespectful of constitutional and legal precedents with New Orleans as 
proof positive.36
 Finally, Battle of New Orleans historiography has recently 
developed cultural and female perspectives, though not prolifically. 
For example, music historian Charles Kinzer explores the role played 
by free blacks who composed the First Battalion of Free Men of Color’s 
unit band. He finds that, during the battle itself, the band played to 
sustain troop morale and performed such patriotic songs as “Yankee 
Doodle” and, for Creole troops, “The Marseillaise.” Kinzer believes that 
members of the free black battalion’s band should not only be recognized 
as the originators of a tradition of American military music, but also as 
the founders of New Orleans’ own distinct musical heritage.37 On the 
other hand, historians Catherine Allgor and Robert Remini investigate 
American women’s primary function in commemorating the Battle of New 
Orleans. Within the larger framework of evaluating women’s political 
roles in the newly established national capital, Allgor relates that in 1828 
Louisa Catherine Adams, wife of presidential candidate John Quincy 
Adams, commemorated the victory of her husband’s arch-rival at New 
35  Ibid., 291. 
36  Tregle, 383. 
37  Charles E. Kinzer, “The Band of Music of the First Battalion of Free Men of Color and the 
Siege of New Orleans, 1814-1815,” American Music 10, no. 3 (Autumn 1992): 348-362. 
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Orleans by means of a grand ball. Allgor asserts that by honoring Jackson, 
John Quincy Adams would “appear to rise above personal interest in 
celebrating a national hero.”38 Yet, since it was thought unseemly to 
actively campaign for the presidency, Louisa Catherine Adams would 
actually be the center of attention, “the representative of the house, her 
husband, her family, and all the political freight associated with the 
event.”39 Similarly, Robert Remini establishes the key role of New Orleans 
women in celebrating Jackson’s victory in the days after the battle, 
describing a scene of young women dressed as “Liberty” and all of the 
current states and territories at a thanksgiving mass.40
 In summary, despite revisionist works, the significance of the 
Battle of New Orleans as a defining moment of national self-confidence 
remains as the prevailing consensus among today’s American historians. 
While consensus exists as to the broad meaning of the battle, much debate 
is focused on the future direction of history about this topic. Author of 
the standard work on the War of 1812, historian Donald Hickey argues 
that since the 1980s the Battle of New Orleans has been better served by 
historians, but their attention has still been disproportionately directed 
toward military and political history rather than the homefront, which 
contains greater potential for new knowledge.41 Future analysis of the 
battle should step beyond traditional constraints and take an in-depth 
look at the human dimension within the topic. A thorough survey of 
women’s role in the war, akin to Drew Gilpin Faust’s equivalent Civil 
War study, is needed, especially in order to answer the question of Creole 
38  Catherine Allgor, Parlor Politics: In Which the Ladies of Washington Help Build a City and a 
Government (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2000), 177. 
39  Ibid., 180.  
40  Remini, Battle of New Orleans, 187-188. 
41  Donald R. Hickey, “The War of 1812: Still A Forgotten Conflict?,” Journal of Military 
History 65, no. 3 (July 2001): 757, 765. 
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women’s unique experience. Likewise, analysis of Native Americans’ role 
in the battle is incomplete, failing to examine how their participation was 
later denied in order to disqualify their citizenship and property rights. 
Moreover, analogous to the marring of Jackson’s legacy by his presidential 
policy of Indian removal, it is foreseeable that the Battle of New Orleans 
will assume the same myth-busting role in connection to him. Ultimately, 
future research should consider New Orleans itself. In January 1815, 
the city had a brief history as part of the United States and contained a 
heterogeneous ethnic citizenry – Americans, English, Spanish, French, 
Haitians, slaves, and free blacks. The process by which such different and 
often competing factions were reconciled and united, both physically in 
arms and psychologically in common patriotic cause, is truly what makes 
the Battle of New Orleans distinctive. 
